

The Examiner also states that *Chew* discloses that tapping may cause selection of an entry (col.7, lines 1-8).

The Examiner admits that *Chew* fails to explicitly mention that the input function is a command symbolized by an icon or that the stylus-up event before the expiration of the selected time causes the command to be executed. The Examiner points to *Clark* for disclosing that tool tips are commonly associated with icons and that when a user selects the icon with a pointing device, the command associated with the icon is carried out (col.1, lines 10-40).

It is respectfully submitted that *Chew* discloses a method of reaching a menu of context dependent commands by pressing and holding the stylus on a selection for a specified length of time. In contrast, in the present invention, the text provided when the physical object interacts with the screen is not a menu of commands but simply a message describing the command symbolized by the icon, such as “image folder” or the information associated with the icon, such as “current time”. *Chew* discloses a context sensitive menu. A context menu is only a list of options or a list of commands. As known in the art, such a menu has nothing to do with icon. For the above reasons, claims 1, 7 and 13 are distinguishable over *Chew*.

Furthermore *Clark* discloses a “tool tip”. Tool tip is used to provide one-direction information, such as a short textual label that appears over an icon to provide a brief identification of the program function associated with the icon. Tool tip and the associated icon are provided on a device to guide a user in selecting a program function associated with an icon. In contrast, the list (300, 700) of options or commands on a context sensitive menu is editable by a user and the commands (402, 404, 406, 408) associated with any item (302, 702) on the menu are the same. In that respect, the context sensitive menu does not guide the user to any function that is not known to the user. When a context sensitive menu is displayed, all the underlying commands associated with the menu items are the same. It would be inconceivable why a person skilled in the art would want to substitute an item in a user-editable context menu with an icon so as to allow a user to activate an icon to reach the same underlying commands.

For the above reasons, it is respectfully submitted that *Chew* in view of *Clark* does not render the claimed invention obvious. Applicant respectfully requests that the 103(a) rejection on claims 1, 7 and 13 be withdrawn.

In rejecting claims 2, 8 and 14, the Examiner states that *Chew* discloses the step of “moving the physical object off the designated area while keeping the physical object substantially on the screen after displaying the message to end the message (col.4, lines 7-9). At col.4, lines 7-9, *Chew* only discloses that the user can dismiss the context menu without making a selection by touching the stylus outside the context menu. At col.4, lines 32 - 34, *Chew* also discloses that the user can dismiss the context menu without making a selection by tapping the stylus outside the context menu. *Chew* uses the words touching and tapping interchangeably. However, *Chew* does not disclose moving the physical object off the designated area while keeping the physical object substantially on the screen. At col.4, lines 27 – 34, *Chew* discloses that once the context menu is displayed, the user may select one of the displayed commands by tapping the selected command with the stylus or dismiss the menu by tapping the stylus outside the menu. In plain English, to tap is to strike gently in an audible blow. To tap the door twice or to tap a computer keyboard to enter data, one must have a motion from non-contacting the surface to contacting the surface and to non-contacting the surface again. At col.1, lines 32 – 34, *Chew* discloses that, in early models of hand-held device, one may tap on the entry in a list once to highlight the entry or tap on the entry twice to open a full window. For the context, such tapping is equivalent to hitting gently.


In that respect, claims 2, 8 and 14 are distinguishable over the cited *Chew* and *Clark* references. Furthermore, claims 2, 8 and 14 are dependent from claims 1, 7 and 13 and recite features not recited in claims 1, 7 and 13. For reasons regarding claims 1, 7, and 13 above, claims 2, 8 and 14 are also distinguishable over *Chew* in view of *Clark*.

As for claims 3, 4, 9, 10 and 15, they are dependent from claims 2, 8 and 14 and recite features not recited in claims 2, 8 and 14. Thus, claims 3, 4, 9, 10 and 15 are also distinguishable over the cited *Chew* and *Clark* references.

CONCLUSION

Claims 1-15 are distinguishable over the cited references. Early allowance of claims 1-15 is earnestly solicited.

Respectfully submitted,



Kenneth Q. Lao
Attorney for the Applicant
Registration No. 40,061

WARE, FRESSOLA, VAN DER SLUYS
& ADOLPHSON LLP
Bradford Green, Building Five
755 Main Street, P.O. Box 224
Monroe, CT 06468
Telephone: (203) 261-1234
Facsimile: (203) 261-5676
USPTO Customer No. 004955